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Roger J. Miner
U.S. Circuit Judge

Evolving Constitutional Concepts of Privacy
New York Law School
September 21, 1987
4:30 P.M.

Good afternoon, and welcome to our panel discussion on
"Evolving Constitutional Concepts of Privacy."

This program is

one in a series sponsored by New York Law School in celebration
of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

It seems

quite fitting that this particular symposium be convened at New
York Law School, because the most distinguished alumnus of the
School, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, was an
important contributor to the evolution of a concept of privacy
embraced in the liberty aspect of the due process clause.
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According to one treatise, "[t]he right to privacy was given
its first exposition by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v.
Ullman."

In that case, which preceded Griswold v. Connecticut by

four years and involved the same Connecticut contraceptive
statute challenged in Griswold, Harlan's dissent included these
words:

"I think the sweep of the Court's decisions, under both

the fourth and fourteenth amendments, amply shows that the
Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all
unreasonable intrusions of whatever character."
The Poe case is not often referred to because the majority
found no justiciable issue in view of the fact that there had
been only one prosecution under the Connecticut statute during
the past seventy-five years.

It was not until later that
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somebody got himself arrested and the Court was constrained to
meet the issue head-on in Griswold.

Justice Douglas there wrote

of "emanations" and "penumbras" for the majority; Justice Harlan,
concurring, adhered to the position he had staked out in the
earlier case; Justice Goldberg danced around the ninth amendment;
there were other opinions, concurring and dissenting, and history
was made.

So much for the New York Law School connection.

It is our purpose to examine, in the course of this
discussion, the nature, origins, validity and prospects for
future development of the constitutional right of privacy.

To

that end, there will an an interchange among the panel members
for an hour or so, and I shall then open the discussion to
questions and comments from the floor.
debate all around.

We anticipate a lively

Now, it is my pleasure to introduce the

members of the panel:
John 0. McGinnis is Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
United States in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel.
He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, where he was a member of
the Law Review.

He served as a clerk for Judge Kenneth Starr of

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the second most important Circuit Court in the nation.
He was an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell and an
attorney-advisor in the Justice Department before his promotion
to his present position.
David Chang is a colleague on the New York Law School
Faculty, where he serves as Associate Professor.
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He is a

graduate of Yale Law School and was an Assistant-in-Instruction
there.

He was a law clerk to United States District Judge W.

Arthur Garrity of the District of Massachusettts.

He teaches

constitutional law here and has published in several areas,
including racial discrimination and equal opportunity.
Norman Dorsen is Stokes Professor of Law at New York
University Law School, where he has been a faculty member since
1961.

He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and was an editor

of its Law Review.

He served as a clerk in the chambers of

Justice Harlan in the Supreme Court and has himself argued
several landmark cases there.

He is the author of a number of

books and articles on constitutional law and civil liberties and,
since 1976, he has been President of the American Civil Liberties
Union.
Harlan L. Dalton has been a member of the faculty of the
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I am Roger J. Miner, Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law
School and also Judge of the United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, the nation's premier appellate court.

I have

been designated to act as Moderator of this panel.
Without further ado, we turn to our interesting, provocative
and controversial topic, "Evolving Constitutional Concepts of
Privacy."

I would like to start out by defining our terms, so to
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open the discussion I pose this question to each member of the
panel:

"What do you understand the phrase "constitutional right

of privacy" to mean"?

What is your definition of the right,

Professor Dorsen?
I.

Definition of the Constitutional Right of Privacy.
(a) Harlan definition -- right that protects "the privacy of

the home against all unreasonable intrusions of whatever
charac·ter."
(b) Right to engage in certain highly personal activites
relating to reproduction, contraception, abortion and marriage.
(cl Rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual and
reproductive activities.
(d) Constitutional condemnation of legislation that
trespasses upon the incidents of marriage, the sanctity of the
home or the nurture of family life.
(e)

Right that allows the formation and preservation of

certain kinds of highly personal relationships -- marriage;
childbirth, raising and education of children, cohabition -- a
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the State.
(f)

Blackmun in Thornburgh dissent refers to decisional and

spatial aspects of right.
(g) Brandeis in Olmstead
II.

"the right to be let alone."

Sources of the Right.
(a) Douglas -- Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights

have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaranties;
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various guarantees create zones of privacy -- 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th
or 9th.

Griswold "concerns a relationship lying within the zone

of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."
(b) Harlan -- 4th, 14th liberty interests.
(c) Goldberg -9th amendment -- pre-existed Constitution.
(d) Associational Liberties.
(e) Unenumerated rights by marriage.
(f) NO SOURCE-- pick and choose protected liberty interest.
III.

Protected Areas and Activities.
1.

Marriage

2.

Contraception

3.

Abortion.

4.

Sterilization

5.

Sodomy (homosexual and heterosexual)

(

IV.

V.

The Basis of Governmental Authority for Interference with
the Right.
1.

Police power

2.

The right as pre-existing

3.

Residual powers of the states - lOth amendmemt

The Cases
1.

Skinner v. Oklahoma

2.

Griswold v. Connecticut

3.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

4.

Carey v. Population Services

5.

Loving v. Virginia
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VI.

6.

Roe v. Wade

7.

Thornburgh v. American College

8.

Stanley v. Georgia

Bowen v. Hardwick & Future of Concept.

1.

5-4 decision

2.

Blackmun dissent refers to right of individual to

conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her
home.

3.

How about application to heterosexuals?

4.

Stevens dissent -- "Liberty" --that animated

development of law in Griswold "embraces the right to engage in
nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider
offensive or immoral."
\

Stages of Abortion Decisions.

)

Stage I:

Roe v. Wade (1973):

or not to terminate pregnancy.

Right of women to decide whether
State interest to regulate

becomes compelling after first trimester.

May prohibit abortions

· ------ ·--onTy-arteCvJ.abTTn:_y-. --Between--endofTrrsE

trrmester ··ana-

viability, states may regulate insofar as regulation is related
to protection of maternal health.
end of first trimester.

1973-1977

No interference by state to
Court struck down series of

state statutes -- Georgia provision requiring abortions to be
performed in accredited hospitals; that all abortions be approved
by Hospital Commission and two doctors.

Missouri requirement for

permission from spouse; Miss. requirement that minors have
parents' permission.
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Stage II - 1977 cases -- upheld state medicaid disbursement
scheme providing for support for childbirth but not for
non-therapeutic abortions.
abortions in city hospitals.

Upheld St. Louis policy prohibiting
1980 Cases upheld statutes refusing

financial aid for all abortions, therapeutic and non-therapeutic,
except as necessary to save life of mother.

Relaxed right of

privacy in face of legitimate state interest in encouraging
childbirth.

1981 case -- upheld state statute (Utah) requiring

notification to parents of minor women.

Allowed state incursion

into areas of privacy.
Stage III - Thornburgh v. American College
(l) Informed consent provision -- list of specific
information to be furnished to woman; detrimental physical and
/

psychological effects; probable gestation age and probable

{

\

anatomical characteristics; medical assistance benefits;
liability of father to assist in support of child; twenty-four
hour wait before consent.
(2) Reporting requirements --physician who performs
abortion after first trimester to report basis for medical
judgments that child not viable; report available to public with
detailed information about doctor, facility, age, race, marital
status, etc.
(3) Level of care of fetus during aboritons performed after
viability.

Required to use techniques to provide best

opportunity for unborn child to be aborted alive unless greater
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risk to life or health of mother.

Also, presence of second

physician required at all abortions where viability is possible.
Held:

Coercive effect.

considers abortion immoral.
access to abortion.

Act tells women that state
Statute intends restriction on

Makes physician agent of State.

with dialogue between woman and her physician.
disclosure of identity -- chilling effect.

)
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Interferes

Possible

